Thus, stock returns may be used to predict future insider trading activity. The strong causality between stock returns and future insider buying and selling transactions is further confi rmed with three out of four employed insider trading indices. The fact of the legal insider trade (either buy or sell) is more important than its volume. The reverse relationship is weak and valid only for longer time horizon of twelve months. Our results indicate that insider traders do not degrade the market effi ciency in the long run.
INTRODUCTION
New information is crucial for profi table trading on fi nancial markets. Insider trading activities are usually considered an additional information signal about fi rm's future performance. Early studies suggest that insiders make abnormal returns (e.g. Rogoff (1964) , Lorie and Niederhoff er (1968) or Jaff e (1964) ) and in the short run are able to identify profi table as well as unprofi table situations in their own fi rms. Seyhun (1988) reveals that corporate insiders were able to predict 60 percent of variation in one-year ahead aggregate stock returns of their own fi rms. Karpoff and Lee (1991) discover that insiders sell their fi rm's common stocks at least for several months prior the announcement of the issue of new common stock or convertible debt. These fi ndings are consistent with the hypothesis that managers have prior information that is conveyed to the market. Lamba and Khan (1999) fi nd that insiders act on their private information before stock exchange listings (purchasing or postponing the sale of stock) or delistings (selling stocks before delisting). As a logical result of such fi ndings, Rozeff and Zaman (1988) show that outsiders can earn abnormal returns by using publicly available insider trading data. At the same time, other evidence by Givoli and Palmon (1985) , Seyhun (1986) and Heinkel and Kraus (1987) demonstrate that investors with insider information on average do not outperform the outsiders. Moreover, the abnormal returns associated with the insider trading become non-positive a er one accounts for transaction costs such as bid-ask spreads and commission fees.
The most recent evidence on the topic largely supports asymmetric information hypothesis of insider trading. Tavakoli et al. (2012) , Cohen et al. (2010) , Gosnell et al. (1992) and Seyhun et al. (1997) fi nd that the trades of directors or other managers have predictive power and that e.g. independent directors make positive abnormal returns before their trades, especially in fi rms with weak corporate governance standards. Insiders also trade before important events such as accounting scandals, takeover announcements or private-equity buyouts. Fidrmuc et al. (2006) investigate the market's reaction to insider transactions in the UK and analyse whether the market reaction depends on the fi rm's ownership. Their fi ndings reveal that ownership by directors and outside shareholders has an impact on the abnormal returns. However, it is also important to adjust for news released before directors' trades. In particular, trades preceded by news on mergers and acquisitions and CEO replacements contain signifi cantly less information. Andriosopoulos et al. (2015) support the theory of Barber and Odean (2008) that retail investor decision-making is infl uenced by attention-grabbing events. Director purchases are just one such attention-grabbing event which is associated with signifi cant positive price returns -the magnitudes of which are linked to the size of the purchase, the size of the fund and the investment mandate. Trading volumes increase at the time of the purchase, but most of the initial price responses and trading volumes dissipate over the following 15 days.
The impact of insider trading on stock prices rises the possibility of market manipulation. Insiders could easily trade and act with attempt to infl uence market prices. Lei and Wang (2014) investigate the insider trading in the US stock market between scheduled versus unscheduled corporate announcements to explore how corporate insiders use their private information. They fi nd that insider buy (sell) more before positive (negative) announcements and their purchases are more profi table before unscheduled announcements than before scheduled ones. In this regard, restrictions on insider trading or requirement on prompt trading disclosures can only enhance the power of insider trades. Fishman and Hagerty (1992) show that mandatory disclosure can increase the expected trading profi ts of insiders because such disclosure can make it profi table to trade even without insider possessing private information about the asset's value. Pattitoni et al. (2013) investigate the eff ectiveness of internal dealings regulation and self-imposed blackout periods on companies in Italy. They fi nd that company self-imposed blackout periods (periods around corporate events during which insiders should not trade) are o en violated as insiders continue trading around corporate events. Their results suggest that managers are the only insiders able to realize abnormal returns and because monitoring all insiders is a costly activity all monitoring resources should be redirected from large shareholders to managers.
Given that insider trading activities have a signifi cant impact on the pricing of stocks due to their morally hazardous behavior of using private corporate information, such activities result in changes of stock market effi ciency. The discussion whether insiders do or do not make abnormal profi t is crucial because it will show whether insiders harm or do not harm the markets. Insiders are usually blamed for lowering market effi ciency, which is measured by the informational content of prices. However, if insiders do not make abnormal returns and their trades cannot predict future prices, market effi ciency is not impaired. Theoretically, as suggested by Penman (1982) , insider earns abnormal returns not only from their legal trading activities but also by sharing private corporate information with other interested parties, and therefore, increasing information asymmetries between individual investors. Bagehot (1971) , Copeland and Galai (1983) or Fishman and Hagerty (1992) see insider trading as the source of the bid-ask spread which deters other traders from acquiring information and trading. On the other hand, as theorized by Manne (1967 Manne ( , 2005 , if insiders are allowed to trade, their trading will make prices more informative. Manne basically sees possible market manipulation as an effi cient way of compensating managers for the information they produce when they run a fi rm and because they then have a greater incentive to produce additional information of value to the fi rm. Degryse et al. (2014) investigate the information content of legal trades by corporate insiders in the Netherlands during the period of 2002-2005. They fi nd that insider purchases are followed by economically large abnormal returns. They fi nd important diff erences in information content of both between purchases and sales as well as between categories of insiders. The result is strongest for purchases by top executives and from small cap fi rms. This is consistent with the expectation that legal insider trading is an important channel through which information fl ows to the market. However, on the other side of evidence, but in diff erent market conditions, Fernandes and Ferreira (2009) fi nd that enforcement of insider trading laws does not improve effi ciency in emerging markets.
Further studies of insider trading activities focus on the analysis of whether abnormal returns also propel insiders to sell or buy their company's stocks. Chowdhury et al. (1993) , Iqbal and Shetty (2002) and Brio et al. (2009) employ Granger causality to investigate relationship between aggregate insider transactions and stock market returns. Chowdhury et al. (1993) fi nd that stock market returns cause insider transactions. They also suggest that the degree of mispricing observed by insider is small partly because of unanticipated macroeconomics factors. Iqbal and Shetty (2002) demonstrate the large impact of stock returns on subsequent insider transactions at the aggregate and fi rm level. This impact according to their fi ndings is negative. Thus, insiders buy a er stock price decreases and sell a er price increases. They also establish weak relationship between insider transactions and future stock returns. The same investigation but for the banking industry was applied by Brio at al. (2009). They reveal causality relationships between insider transactions and future stock movements only at fi rm's level.
The duality of the relationship between insider trading activities and stock returns is certainly country-specifi c, as was suggested by previous studies. Since the majority of studies on insider trading activities explore US or UK stock markets, we examine the validation of insider tradingstock returns causality on the biggest Eurozone stock market -German stock market. The German stock market is usually overlooked by researchers of insider trading eff ects, but should be considered an interesting example for the purposes of our study. First, it functions within the bank-based fi nancial system, where banks could acquire more information (even internal) than individual investors. Second, the legislation on insider information based transactions come into eff ect in 1994, later than in many other developed countries, with reporting requirement being added in 2002.
To our knowledge, there are only few studies investigating insider trading activities in the German stock market. Betzer and Theissen (2009) analyse 2050 transactions by corporate insiders in Germany in the period from July 1, 2002 to June 20, 2004 and fi nd that insider trades are associated with signifi cant abnormal returns. They discover that market model adjusted CARs amounted to 3.6% in 20 days a er insider purchases and −3.54% a er insider sales. Furthermore, insider trades that occur prior to an earnings announcement have a large impact on prices. This result is consistent with information asymmetries between corporate insiders and the capital market being larger prior to earnings announcements. At the same time, the position of the insider within the fi rm has no eff ect. Rau (2004) and Stotz (2006) fi nd that insiders abuse their superior knowledge about fi rms' perspectives with the aim to gain abnormal returns. Furthermore, outsiders can profi t from this information indirectly by basing their trading strategies on insiders' dealings.
The contribution of our analysis to the literature is twofold. First, the paper focuses on the formulated possible dual causality between insider trading activities and stock returns on the German stock market during time period that have not been previously examined. Hence, we cover not only returns growth triggered by insider transactions, but also insider transactions fueling market incentives for other participants. Second, we propose the application of the novel heterogeneous approach to Granger causality in panels as proposed by Dumitrescu and Hurlin (2012) to the analysis of insider transactions.
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
Thirty biggest German blue chip stocks were chosen for the purposes of our investigation. All stocks were traded on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange in the period January 2006 to December 2014. The data on insider activities are collected on monthly basis for each individual fi rm and obtained from Bloomberg. Insider transactions include open market transactions (net sell and buy in shares) of 12 kinds of legal insiders (diff erent levels for the members of the executive board, members of the supervisory board, managers). Following Lamba and Khan (1999) and Iqbal and Shetty (2002) we only consider transactions of 100 shares or more because these transactions could be likely considered as information motivated. The total amount of insider transactions in the constructed dataset is 1,107.
Stock returns are calculated as logarithm of price diff erences:
where P i is monthly stock price at time i.
Tab. I provides descriptive statistics of the comprised dataset.
Tab To match the stationarity of return series, we measure the degree of insider transactions by four activity indices. The fi rst two indices were suggested by John and Lang (1991) and later employed by YurAustin (1998), Iqbal and Shetty (2002) and Brio et al. (2008) . The net number index NNI is defi ned as:
where P represents aggregate number of insider buy transactions and S is aggregate number of insider sale transactions. This index evaluates insider trading activity due to positive or negative news reports, when positive new report leads to increase of buying transactions and decrease of selling transactions and vice versa. Analogously, the volume of transactions is measured with the net share index (NSI):
where PV and SV represent aggregate number of shares bought and sold by insiders in a particular month, respectively. The remaining two indices characterize insider buying and selling separately. According to Chowdhury et al. (1993) , insider buying transactions have more information content than sell transactions. Same fi ndings are reported in studies of Sayhun (1990 Sayhun ( , 1992 . The insider buying index PNI is donated as:
while insider selling index SNI is defi ned as: Source: Authors'calculation by insider. The value of insider selling index SNI is very close to zero in all of analyzed periods, since the number of selling transactions are relatively smaller than the number of buying transactions. Tab. IV reports correlation coeffi cients between stock returns and insider trading indices. The positive correlation is found between stock returns and insider selling transactions (SNI), while negative correlation is apparent between stock returns and insider buying transactions (PNI). These fi ndings resemble those of Iqbal and Shetty (2002) . To analyze the relationships between stock returns and insider trading indicators, we use Granger (1969) causality procedure. But instead of taking time series pairwise approach to Granger causality, we follow Dumitrescu-Hurlin (2012) approach to non-causality in heterogeneous panel data with fi xed eff ects. Since this econometric approach takes into consideration two dimensions of heterogeneity (the heterogeneity of the regression model and the heterogeneity of the causality relationships), we can rephrase the goal of the panel causality test as to fi nd if one variable causes another variable somewhere in the panel.
Granger causality is computed by running bivariate regression that in a panel data context take the following form:
where t determines the time period dimensions of the panel and i denotes the cross-sectional dimensions.
and the individual eff ects  l,i are assumed to be fi xed in the time dimension, but allowed to be diff erent across cross-sections: 
IV: Correlation between monthly returns and insider transactions represented by activity indices
Under the null hypothesis, we assume that there is no causality relationship for any of the units in the panel (the homogenous non-causality hypothesis):
Under the alternative hypothesis, there is a causality relationship from x i,t to y i,t with varying  i across groups:
where N 1 is unknown but satisfi es the condition 0 < N 1 /N < 1. The causality tests are conducted for constant lag (K) periods of 1, 3 and 12 months. The lag orders are identical for all cross-sectional units in the panel.
The average of individual Wald statistics W i,T associated with the individual test of the noncausality H 0 :  i = 0 is defi ned as:
For i = 1, …, N each the individual Wald statistic W i,T is defi ned as:
where Z 
By 
The standardized test statistic HNC N Z  for fi xed T samples is:
The detailed characteristics of both test statistics are provided in Dumitrescu and Hurlin (2012) .
RESULTS
We fi rst test the causality from the index NNI to stock returns and vice versa. Then we test the same causality relationships with the other indices NSI, PNI and SNI, respectively. For each pair, Wald statistic and standardized test statistics were computed. These statistics are computed for one, three and twelve months' lags. The results are reported in Tabs. V-VIII.
Tab. V presents the results for the causality between the index NNI and stock returns and stock returns and the NNI index, respectively. The homogeneous non causality between stock returns and index NNI is rejected at 1% level for the lag of one and three months. Hence, the past stock returns may be useful for the forecasting of the standardized volume of net purchases in the period of one and three months, respectively.
Results of testing causality between the stock returns and index NSI that represents the volume of insider transactions are reported in Tab. VI. In that relationship, the non-causality between stock returns and volume of insider transactions is rejected at 1% level for lag one and 5% level for lag three. Thus, the past stock returns infl uence the volume of insider activities in the time horizon of the one and three months.
Results of the relationship between stock returns and index PNI that measures the share of insider Note: *, **, *** denote signifi cance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively Source: Authors' calculations buying transactions to the insider transactions as a whole are presented in Tab. V. The results suggest that in the horizon of one and three months the past stock returns may be employed to predict number of insider purchasing activities. In the horizon of twelve months, the situation is diff erent and the past number of buying transaction has an impact on future stock returns.
Tab. VIII demonstrates the results of the causality testing between index SNI that measures the share of insider selling transactions to the number of insider transactions as a whole and stock returns. The homogeneous non causality hypothesis is not rejected in any tested situation. Thus, there is no evidence of the causality between these two variables. Note: *, **, *** denote signifi cance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have analyzed the causality relationships between stock returns and insider transactions using aggregate monthly panel data of German blue chips from 2006 to 2014. The examination is based on heterogeneous panel Granger causality of Dumitrescu and Hurlin (2012) . Our fi ndings show strong relationship between stock returns and future insider trading activities in the time period of one and three months. These results are confi rmed be three out of four insider trading activity indices. The fact of the legal insider trade (either buy or sell) is more important than its volume. These eff ects diminishes in the longer time horizon. The reverse causality between insider transactions and subsequent stock returns based on our dataset of monthly observations is weak and exists only in the longer time horizon of 12 months. These fi ndings are consistent with the fi ndings of Chowdhury et al. (1993) and Iqbal and Shetty (2002) . But compared to previous studies on the German stock market, the eff ect of insider transactions on stock prices is not discovered in the longer (one month) time horizon, and thus seems to diminish in the long run, whereas the eff ect of stock price changes on insider trading activities is only present in the long run. Hence, corporate insiders could be considered as regular market participants, for whom insider transactions are the form of compensation as suggested by Manne (1967 Manne ( , 2005 . As the result, insider traders do not degrade the market effi ciency in the long run. However, and this is the main drawback of our study, our results cannot shed light on whether corporate insiders are able to manipulate the stock market, since most of manipulations are short-lived and infrequent.
